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The Tarasoff3 decision has been branded “one of the most significant developments in medico-legal
jurisprudence of the past century”.4 For the first time, a court held that psychotherapists have a duty to
protect third parties from patients who pose a serious danger of violence to others.5 That ruling of the
Supreme Court of California has generated a great deal of litigation and controversy. Decision-makers
and commentators remain divided on the wisdom and proper application of Tarasoff.6 The decision
continues to be the subject of significant debate both within the United States and abroad.
This paper is intended to serve as an update for psychiatrists on notable developments of the Tarasoff
doctrine in the United States and United Kingdom. Most clinicians will be familiar with the basic Tarasoff
doctrine. However, the author suspects that many clinicians will be troubled to learn the extent to which
Tarasoff liability has extended in some jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the first part of this paper addresses notable judicial treatment of Tarasoff in several state
jurisdictions within the United States. The second part discusses the more conservative approach of the
United Kingdom, which affords clinicians discretion to warn potential victims in certain circumstances.
The United Kingdom has struggled with, and so far rejected, the imposition of a Tarasoff-duty. However,
a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights opens the door for something comparable to
Tarasoff in the United Kingdom.7 The final part offers a critique of the Tarasoff doctrine and suggests that
other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, may be wise to avoid this problematic doctrine.
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PART ONE: THE UNITED STATES
Before considering the development of the Tarasoff doctrine, it is worth briefly revisiting some key aspects
of the Tarasoff judgment.
A duty to protect
Mental health professionals worldwide will be familiar with the protective duty fashioned by Tobriner J in
Tarasoff: 
Once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should
have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.8
Essentially, the Tarasoff Court weighed the public interest in confidentiality and effective treatment of
mental illness against the public interest in safety from violent assault.9 The majority concluded: 
“The public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins”.10 The majority’s rationale for creating the
protective duty was: “In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger
that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal”.11 Thus, the
duty was created to protect third persons from serious harm caused by dangerous patients.12
The “special relationship”
It is noteworthy that the duty of care found to exist in Tarasoff, and which is central to the Court’s
conclusion, is exceptional to the common law. It is a general rule of the common law that one does not
owe a duty to control the conduct of another, or to warn those endangered by such conduct.13 At
common law there is no general duty to prevent others from suffering foreseeable loss or damage caused
by the deliberate wrongdoing of third parties.14 For example, there is no legal obligation on a bystander
to intervene to prevent a murder. The fundamental reason is that the common law is reluctant to impose
liability for “pure omissions” to act.15 Nonetheless, some exceptions have been carved out of the general
rule. 
In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court stated that an exception exists when a defendant therapist stands in a
special relationship either with the wrongdoer, or the foreseeable victim.16 The Court held that there is
such a “special relationship” between a patient and therapist, sufficient to support the existence of a duty
to protect foreseeable victims. The Court’s construction of this duty is central to its conclusion of liability
against the therapist.
In a critical passage of reasoning, the majority held that the doctor-patient relationship was a “special
relationship” sufficient to support the existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others
from dangers emanating from the patient’s illness.17 The Court stated that therapy alone is sufficiently
8 Tarasoff, supra note 3 at 350.
9 Ibid. at 351.
10 Ibid. at 352.
11 Ibid. at 353.
12 Alan Felthous & Claudia Kachigan, “To Warn and to Control:
Two Distinct Legal Obligations or Variations of a Single
Duty to Protect?” (2001) 19 Behav. Sci. Law 355 at 355.
13 Tarasoff, supra note 3 at 342.
14 Smith v Littlewoods [1987] 1 All ER 710 at 729.
15 Ibid.
16 Tarasoff, supra note 3 at 342.
17 Ibid. at 348.
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controlling for a duty to exist when the patient’s potential for violence to another is foreseeable.18 The
Court did not require either a verbal threat from the patient, or control through hospitalisation, for the
duty to be triggered.19
“Reasonably necessary” steps
The Court stated that the protective duty may require a therapist to take various steps depending on the
facts of the individual case: “Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to
apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably
necessary under the circumstances”.20
The Court’s ruling leaves open to interpretation what actions would discharge the duty to protect an
intended victim.21 Thus, even if a therapist unequivocally warns a third party of threats made by a
patient, if harm ensues a court may still hold that a therapist has failed to take sufficient steps to protect
the victim.
Chaimowitz states that while the purpose of informing or warning is to protect, in some situations a
warning may be insufficient, or even increase the risk to the victim.22 Similarly, Appelbaum states that
warnings are of “dubious utility”23 and notes that the Tarasoff doctrine grants considerable scope to
clinicians in the selection of a course of action that would protect potential victims:
Although the first Tarasoff decision in 1974 established a “duty to warn” likely victims, when the case
was redecided in 1976, the obligation was broadened to a “duty to protect”, an approach adopted by
subsequent courts. This change means the responsibility to protect third parties is not limited to a
warning; other steps may be required. Clearly, when unidentifiable victims are involved, other
measures must be taken. Depending on the circumstances, one might chose to hospitalize the patient
(voluntarily or involuntarily), to transfer an already hosptialized patient to a more secure ward, or to
maintain the outpatient status but begin medication, intensive individual therapy, family therapy, or
other systems-oriented therapy, which might even involve the potential victim. Many clinicians will
choose one of these steps whenever possible in preference to breaching confidentiality by issuing a
warning.24
McNiel notes that several interventions besides warnings have been widely recommended for managing
the risk of violence in patients who make threats.25 McNiel states that additional options include
involuntary hospitalization, intensified outpatient treatment, psychotropic medication, removal of
weapons and conjoint sessions which may involve the person who is the target of the threat.26
Givelber states that while there may be some situations in which warning the victim is the most
reasonable response, many therapists have suggested, since even before the Tarasoff decision, that
18 Felthous & Kachigian, supra note 12 at 358.
19 Ibid.
20 Tarasoff, supra note 3 at 340.
21 Michael Huber, et al., “A Survey of Police Officers’
Experience with Tarasoff Warnings in Two States” (2000)
51 Psychiatr. Serv 807 at 807.
22 Gary Chaimowitz, Graham Glancy & Janice Blackburn,
“The Duty to Warn and Protect – Impact on Practice”
(2000) 45 CJP 899 at 900.
23 Paul Appelbaum, “Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems in
Fulfilling the Duty to Protect” (1985) 142:4 Am J
Psychiatry 425 at 427.
24 Ibid. at 426.
25 Dale McNiel, Renee Binder & Forrest Fulton,
“Management of Threats of Violence Under California’s
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different measures will be appropriate in other situations.27 Liability will be determined by what a
“reasonable” therapist would have done in the circumstances.
The impact of Tarasoff
Tarasoff was initially greeted with prophecies of doom from many within the mental health professions.
They predicted that Tarasoff would extinguish the trust and confidentiality essential to effective
psychotherapy.28 However, the duty to protect has not been applied uniformly across the United States.29
The issue of whether or not such a duty exists is a state tort law issue, not a matter of federal law.30 States
have variously embraced, expanded, restricted or rejected Tarasoff.31
California extends Tarasoff... 
California is one state that has expanded the duty to protect far beyond its original limits. As a direct
response to the Tarasoff decision, the legislature of California limited the broad duty to protect that it
introduced, by codifying a narrower “duty to warn”. The duty to warn is triggered only when a patient
communicates to a therapist a serious threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim.32
However, the courts of California have once again expanded the liability of therapists.
... to emergency settings...
In Jablonski33, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the duty to an emergency setting.34 In that
case, Jablonski was brought to the emergency department of a hospital by his girlfriend after he
threatened her mother with a knife and attempted to rape her.35 Dr Kopiloff examined Jablonski and
diagnosed him with an anti-social personality disorder that rendered him “potentially dangerous”.36
However, Dr Kopiloff concluded that there was no basis for involuntary hospitalisation.37 No attempt was
made to locate Jablonski’s past medical records, which would have revealed a history of schizophrenia and
violence.
Shortly after his release from hospital, Jablonski attacked and murdered his girlfriend.38 Despite the
absence of any specific threat directed towards an identifiable person, the Court held the hospital liable
for its failure to obtain Jablonski’s past medical records and adequately warn the victim. Thus, Jablonski
expanded Tarasoff by holding that a history of violent behaviour can reveal a danger that will be sufficient
to indicate the foreseeability of harm to a particular victim or class of victims.39 Further, a protective duty
may be imposed on a treating psychiatrist even in an emergency setting.
27 Daniel Givelber, William Bowers & Carolyn Blitch,
“Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action” (1984) Wisconsin Law Review
443 at 465.
28 Daniel Shuman & Myron Weiner, “The Privilege Study:
An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege” (1982) 60 North Carolina Law Review 893 at
914.
29 Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public
Peril Begins: 25 Years After Tarasoff” (2000) 21 The
Journal of Legal Medicine 187 at 200.
30 United States v. Chase 340 F.3d 978 at 996.
31 Hubbard, supra note 6 at 429. 
32 Cal. Civ. Code 43.92.
33 Jablonski v. United States 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983)
[Jablonski].
34 Buckner & Firestone, supra note 29 at 201.
35 Jablonski, supra note 33 at 393.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. at 394.
38 Ibid.
39 Damon Walcott, Pat Cerundolo & James Beck, “Current
Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: an Evolution towards the
Limitation of the Duty to Protect” (2001) 19 Behav. Sci.
Law 325 at 330.
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... to threats reported by family members
In Ewing40, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that the communication of a
threat by a close family member was equivalent to a threat communicated directly by a patient and
triggered a duty to warn the potential victim.41 In Ewing, the patient confided to his father that he was
considering harming his ex-girlfriend’s new partner. The father notified the patient’s therapist, Dr
Goldstein, who arranged for the patient’s voluntary hospitalisation at a nearby medical centre by a staff
psychiatrist. The following day, the staff psychiatrist discharged the patient because he was not suicidal,
despite Dr Goldstein urging him to keep the patient hospitalised. 
Dr Goldstein had no further contact with the patient.42 At no stage did Dr Goldstein warn the victim
who was the subject of the patient’s threat. The day after he was discharged the patient shot his intended
target and then committed suicide. Dr Goldstein was held liable in negligence for failing to warn the
victim based on the credible threat disclosed by the father.43
Ewing has been criticised by some scholars for extending the duty to warn beyond the scope and intent
of the Californian legislation.44 The legislation specifically states that a duty arises only when a patient
communicates a threat to a psychotherapist.45 The author shares Edwards’s concern that Ewing opens the
door to the imposition of liability on clinicians based on third-party, hearsay communications.46 Edwards
states: “There is no way Dr Goldstein could have truly known the intent or seriousness of the threat
without the threat being conveyed directly to Dr Goldstein”.47 Yet, one phone call was enough for the
Court to impose a duty upon Dr Goldstein.48
In a similar vein, Smith has criticised Ewing because, in her view, therapists will have no way of confirming
whether “the communication is accurate, is made by a family member, or whether the family member is
acting maliciously or in the best interests of the patient”.49 In Smith’s view, Ewing creates “amorphous
liability standards” for therapists.50
Nebraska: extending Tarasoff to the protection of strangers
In Lipari51, the Federal District Court recognised a duty on therapists that extends to protecting strangers.
In that case, a patient was receiving psychiatric care from a Veterans Administration. The patient
purchased a shotgun and used it in a random attack at a crowded nightclub, killing one person.52 The
Court held that a duty to protect would arise, even though no specific threats were made by the patient
against any specific person. Thus, the Court dispensed with the need for an identifiable victim and
required “only that the doctor reasonably foresee that the risk engendered by his patient’s condition
40 Ewing v. Goldstein 15 Cal Rptr. 3d 864 [Ewing].
41 Robert Weinstock, Gabor Vari, Gregory Long & Arturo
Silva, “Back to the Past in California: A Temporary
Retreat to a Tarasoff Duty to Warn” (2006) 34 (4)
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the
Law 523 at 526.
42 Ewing, supra note 40 at 867.
43 Weinstock, Vari, Long & Arturo Silva, supra note 39 at
526.
44 Gwynneth Smith, “Ewing v. Goldstein and the Therapist’s
Duty to Warn in California” (2006) 36 Golden Gate U.
L. Rev. 293 at 296. 
45 Edwards, Deborah, “Duty to Warn – Even if it may be
Hearsay? The Implications of a Psychotherapists Duty to
Warn a Third Person when Information is Obtained from
Someone Other than his Patient” (2006) 3 Ind. Health L.
Rev. 171 at 182.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. at 183.
48 Ibid.
49 Smith, supra note 44 at 299.
50 Ibid. at 297.
51 Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 497 F.Supp. 185 (D.
Neb. 1980) at 187 [Lipari].
52 Buckner & Firestone, supra note 29 at 200.
50
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would endanger other persons”.53 Following Lipari, Nebraskan therapists have a duty to protect anyone
foreseeably endangered by a patient.54
PART TWO: THE UNITED KINGDOM
Current position
The United Kingdom Court of Appeal has confirmed that UK psychiatrists have discretion, but not a duty, to
warn potential victims in certain circumstances. Egdell55 and Crozier56 confirm that a psychiatrist is permitted
to depart from the duty of confidentiality to issue warnings about a patient who is believed to present a real
and serious threat to third parties.57 Less certain, however, is whether a psychiatrist could be duty-bound to
give a warning or take other steps to protect third parties from foreseeably dangerous patients.58
Whilst the courts in Egdell and Crozier recognised discretion to depart from the duty of confidentiality,
they were not asked to, and did not recognise, a duty upon psychiatrists to do so. To date no such duty
has been acknowledged in a United Kingdom court.59 However, the European Court of Human Rights’
ruling in Osman60 has opened the door to the introduction of a doctrine analogous to Tarasoff in the
United Kingdom.61 Notwithstanding Osman, doubt surrounds the question of whether such a duty would
be recognised by domestic courts.62
Osman
The United Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).63
Accordingly, the ECHR applies to all residents of the United Kingdom64 and it is unlawful for a public
authority to act contrary to an ECHR right.65 The ECHR may well impose obligations on healthcare
professionals, including psychiatrists employed by the National Health Service (“NHS”).66 In particular,
obligations might flow from Article 2 of the ECHR which affirms the right to life.67 In Osman, the
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) used Article 2 to introduce a positive obligation to protect
third parties into United Kingdom law.68
In Osman, Mrs Osman sued local police for failing to protect her now deceased husband. Mr Osman was
shot dead by a teacher, Paget-Lewis, who had formed an obsessive attachment with their son. Mrs Osman
argued that the police had failed to act on warning signs that Paget-Lewis represented a serious threat to
her family.69 The evidence indicated that Paget-Lewis was jealous of her son’s relationship with another
student at school. Paget-Lewis had allegedly vandalised the Osmans’ property, wrote slanderous graffiti
on school premises and stole a shotgun that was used in the shooting of Mr Osman. The English Court
of Appeal dismissed the claim on a public policy ground – that the police could not be negligent for
failures relating to the investigation of crime.70
53 Lipari, supra note 51 at 194.
54 Walcott, Cerundolo & Beck, supra note 39 at 330.
55 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359 [Egdell].
56 R v Crozier [1991] Crim LR 138 [Crozier].
57 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 255.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Osman v UK [1999] 1 FLR 193 [Osman].
61 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 256.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. at 257.
64 Michael Perlin, “’You Got No Secrets to Conceal’:
Considering the Application of the Tarasoff Doctrine
Abroad” (2006) 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 611 at 618.
65 Section 6(1) Human Rights Act 1998 (qualified by
section 6 (2)).
66 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 257.
67 Perlin, supra note 64 at 619.
68 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 258.
69 Osman, supra note 60 at 199.
70 Ibid. at 207.
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Mrs Osman then petitioned the ECtHR for a remedy. On the facts, the Court dismissed the claim under
Article 2 because the criminal conduct of Paget-Lewis was not reasonably foreseeable by the police. The
Court held that Mrs Osman had:
[F]ailed to point to any decisive stage in the sequence of the events leading up to the tragic shooting
when it could be said that the police knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family
were at real and immediate risk from Paget-Lewis. While the applicants have pointed to a series of
missed opportunities which would have enabled the police to neutralise the threat posed by Paget-
Lewis, for example by searching his home for evidence to link him with the graffiti incident or by
having him detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 or by taking more active investigative steps
following his disappearance, it cannot be said that these measures, judged reasonably, would in fact
have produced that result or that a domestic court would have convicted him or ordered his detention
in a psychiatric hospital on the basis of the evidence adduced before it.71
Despite the dismissal of Mrs Osman’s claim on the facts, critically, the Court stated that Article 2 could
give rise to “a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual”.72 As to the scope of this
obligation, the Court stated:
[B]earing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, such
an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate
burden on the authorities…. In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the
authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their
above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person, it must be established to
its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third
party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably,
might have been expected to avoid that risk.73
It is worth noting that the above passage from Osman, bears a close resemblance to the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff. Osman has since been interpreted by one scholar as imposing a
duty to protect third parties upon state employees in the United Kingdom, including psychiatrists
employed by the NHS.74 The duty is derived from Article 2 of the ECHR, which protects the right to life.
However, unless and until an expanded duty is recognised, any legal recourse against state employed
psychiatrists for failure to protect third parties would lie against the United Kingdom government and not
against a psychiatrist personally.75
Palmer
Osman was considered by the English Court of Appeal in Palmer.76 That case concerned a former
psychiatric patient who abducted, sexually assaulted and murdered a 4 year-old girl.77 One year prior to
the murder, the patient stated that he had sexual feelings towards children and that a child would be
71 Ibid. at 220.
72 Ibid. at 218.
73 Ibid.
74 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 267.
75 Ibid. at 266.
76 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med
351 [Palmer].
77 Ibid. at 351.
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murdered after he was discharged from hospital.78 The victim’s mother sued the hospital for failing to
foresee the risk of the patient committing serious sexual offences against children.79
At first instance, the judge struck out the claim and this decision was subsequently upheld by the Court
of Appeal. On the facts, the Court of Appeal distinguished Osman because in the present case there was
no prior relationship between the patient and the victim.80 The Court held that because there was no
pre-existing connection between the patient and the specific victim, the requisite degree of proximity for
negligence was absent.
Significantly, Stuart-Smith LJ expressed reservations about the propriety of the Osman decision in the
English context: “I respectfully agree with Lord Browne-Wilkinson that it is not easy to understand the
decision of the Strasbourg Court in the context of the English law of negligence”.81 Further, the Court
proceeded to reject Tarasoff itself. Lord Stuart-Smith stated that the Tarasoff duty proceeded on “the
premise that there is a special relationship between the defendant and either the third or the foreseeable
victims. In English law it is plainly not sufficient that this relationship exists only between the defendant
and third party”.82
Discussion 
In the author’s view, Palmer is an early indication that domestic English courts will be reluctant to apply
Osman reasoning to cement a tort law duty on psychiatrists to protect third parties. Gavaghan states that
the notion of a positive duty to protect third parties under domestic British law is a “very radical one”.83
However, some scholars view Osman as the first step towards the recognition of a European Tarasoff. In
Hubbard’s view, the Osman decision is “an early sign of how the law on duties to third parties may
develop” in the United Kingdom.84 Similarly, Perlin argues that Osman represents a move towards the
recognition of a duty to protect. Perlin states that: “Of course, Osman was not, strictly speaking, a ‘Tarasoff
case’. But there is no question in my mind that it helped create a judicial environment that will be more
sympathetic to such claims”.85 Time will tell whether Perlin’s prediction proves accurate. However, the
early judicial indication from Palmer is that domestic English courts will be slow to impose a Tarasoff duty
in that jurisdiction.
PART THREE: A CRITIQUE OF TARASOFF
There are several reasons why United Kingdom decision makers should be sceptical about Tarasoff’s
“enlightened approach”. 
Lack of control over patients
In many cases, a psychiatrist will lack the necessary degree of control over a patient to justify the
imposition of a duty. For instance, psychiatrists usually have little control over voluntary patients who do
not satisfy the criteria for involuntary commitment. Similarly, psychiatrists will have little control over
outpatients.86 For example, Tarasoff itself concerned a voluntary outpatient who was not in treatment at
the relevant time; whose potential victim was out of the country at the time of the threats; and who
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Perlin, supra note 64 at 623.
81 Palmer, supra note 76 at 354.
82 Ibid. at 359.
83 Gavaghan, supra note 7 at 267.
84 Hubbard, supra note 6 at 441.
85 Perlin, supra note 64 at 625.
86 Stone, supra note 5 at 366.
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committed the murder three months after revealing his feelings during therapy.87
Support for this view can be found in the judgment of the Florida Court of Appeals in Boynton.88 The
Florida Court of Appeals strongly rejected the Tarasoff approach: 
Although other jurisdictions have followed the lead of the California Supreme Court in the landmark
decision of Tarasoff v Regents of Univ. of California, we reject that “enlightened” approach. Florida
courts have long been loathe [sic] to impose liability based on a defendant’s failure to control the
conduct of a third party.89
The Court stated that the “special relationship” between a patient and therapist relied on in Tarasoff to
create the protective duty, is implicitly premised on a psychiatrist’s ability to control their patient.90 Yet,
the Tarasoff Court did not address the issue of control.91 In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of California
simply stated that: 
[T]here now seems to be sufficient authority to support the conclusion that by entering into a doctor-
patient relationship the therapist becomes sufficiently involved to assume some responsibility for the
safety, not only of the patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be
threatened by the patient.92
In stark contrast, the Florida Court of Appeals recognised that most therapeutic relationships will not
contain any element of control.93 The Court held that the relationship between a psychiatrist and a
voluntary outpatient lacked the necessary element of control for the creation of a duty to protect other
parties.94 It is submitted that the Court’s reasoning is persuasive. Moreover, there must be strength in
Stone’s analysis: “Once the suggestion of control is eliminated, there is nothing in the nature of the
relationship between a psychiatrist and his patient to support an exception to the tort law presumption”.95
In the absence of control, the Tarasoff Court appeared to rely upon the responsibilities inherent in social
living and human relations, and the spirit of the Good Samaritan. The Boynton Court declined to “fashion
a rule of law from such social duties”.96
Causation problems
The second reason why Tarasoff should be avoided relates to causation. It is submitted that there are
glaring problems of causation with the Tarasoff doctrine. Put simply, it is not clear that the psychologist’s
failure to warn the victim in Tarasoff could be said to have caused the victim’s death. Conspicuously, there
is no causation analysis in the Tarasoff decision. 
It will be recalled that in Tarasoff, Tobriner J stated that the protective duty may require a therapist to
take various steps depending on the facts of the individual case, including warning the potential victim,
notifying the police, or taking whatever other steps might be reasonably necessary to protect the potential
victim.97 Further, Tobriner J stated: “Some of the alternatives open to the therapist, such as warning the
victim, will not result in the drastic consequences of depriving the patient of his liberty”.98 However, a
87 Gutheil, supra note 4 at 346.
88 Boynton v. Burglass 590 So. 2d 446 [Boynton].
89 Ibid. at 448.
90 Ibid. at 448.
91 Ibid. at 449.
92 Tarasoff, supra note 3, at 349.
93 Boynton, supra note 88 at 449.
94 Ibid.
95 Stone, supra note 5, at 366.
96 Boynton, supra note 88 at 451.
97 Tarasoff, supra note 3 at 340.
98 Ibid. at 350.
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therapist who has failed to warn a victim should not be liable for a victim’s injuries or death if their failure
to warn was not a cause in fact of such injuries or death. 
Settled principles of tort law require factual causation before liability will be imposed in negligence. The
‘but for’ test is used to ensure this minimum level of factual causation. To satisfy this test, the plaintiff
would have to prove that had Ms Tarasoff been warned of Mr Poddar’s threat, she would have avoided
being killed by Mr Poddar. It is far from clear whether a warning would have averted the danger. It is
entirely conceivable that Mr Poddar would have killed Ms Tarasoff, notwithstanding that she was aware
of the very danger posed by Mr Poddar. The most that can be said is that, due to the psychologist’s failure
to warn her, Ms Tarasoff lost the opportunity to avoid being harmed by Mr Poddar. Based on traditional
common law principles of causation, this would be insufficient to establish causation. 
Of course, it was open to the Tarasoff Court to relax the ordinary rules of causation and apply a lower
standard of causation in the particular circumstances of the case. However, the Court did not do so.
Moreover, the Court failed to explain how causation was established on existing principles.
It is submitted that a Tarasoff duty can only ever make sense in terms of causation if one interprets it as
requiring a therapist to commit for involuntary treatment a patient who poses a serious danger to others.
‘But for’ causation would be established because the victim would certainly have avoided the harm had
the therapist properly committed the patient. However, the majority in Tarasoff was careful to avoid
establishing a duty on therapists to civilly commit a patient. Therefore, in the author’s view, Tarasoff
liability sits uncomfortably with traditional common law principles of causation. 
Uncertain standard of care
A third reason to avoid a Tarasoff-type duty relates to the uncertain standard of care that the decision
purports to impose upon therapists. The standard of care required by Tarasoff is that of the reasonable
therapist:
[T]he therapist need only exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of that professional specialty under similar circumstances. Within
the broad range of reasonable practice and treatment in which professional opinion and judgment
may differ, the therapist is free to exercise his or her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided
by hindsight, that he or she judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence.99
Mosk J stated that a psychiatrist’s prediction of violence stands to be examined against “conformity to
standards of the profession”.100 Yet, one must wonder what common standards the court is referring to,
when no such standards exist within the profession itself. Of course, psychiatry has developed a range of
risk assessment tools designed to predict dangerousness. However, it appears that there is little consensus
within the profession as to what constitutes reasonable practice. In his dissenting judgment in Tarasoff,
Clark J referred to evidence that suggested: 
[T]he chances of a second psychiatrist agreeing with the diagnosis of a first psychiatrist are barely
better than 50-50; or stated differently, there is about as much chance that a different expert would
come to some different conclusion as there is that the other would agree.101
Unlike a physician’s diagnosis, which can be verified by x-ray or surgery for example, a psychiatrist cannot
verify his diagnosis, treatment or predicted prognosis except by long-term follow-up and reporting. 
99 Ibid. at 349.
100 Ibid. at 361.
101 Ibid. at 371.
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The Court in Boynton described the problem in this way: “The outward manifestations of infectious
diseases lend themselves to accurate and reliable diagnoses. However, the internal workings of the human
mind remain largely mysterious”.102
Although Tarasoff purports to impose a standard of reasonableness, the reality is that the decision imposes
an uncertain, higher standard of care that is determined by the hindsight judgment of a court. Because
the standard is without meaningful content within psychiatry, the reality is that psychiatrists are exposed
to potential liability unless they do in fact accurately predict dangerousness.103 The question of whether
a psychiatrist actually did predict dangerousness becomes indistinguishable from whether they should
have done so.104 The question will be whether a reasonable psychiatrist would have made that prediction,
albeit under the guise of ascertaining whether this psychiatrist actually did so.105 Surely it is unfair to
impose such an uncertain, retrospective duty on psychiatrists.
The problem of confining a duty to protect 
It has been seen that some jurisdictions within the United States have expanded the protective duty to
emergency settings, to threats notified by family members and even to unknown victims. The possibility
that the adoption of a protective duty in the United Kingdom might lead to a similar expansion must be
of some concern. 
The United Kingdom would be wise to note that many courts in the United States have struggled to
confine the Tarasoff doctrine. Attempts to place reasonable limits on the duty have been fraught with
difficulty. For example, the specificity rule (which requires specific threats against specific victims before
a duty to protect will be imposed on a therapist) was created to limit and clarify the circumstances that
would trigger the duty. Prima facie, the rule appears to successfully limit the protective duty. Indeed,
variations of the rule have since been adopted in a number of states. The specificity rule is not, however,
without weakness.
Borum and Reddy argue that the specificity rule creates an arbitrary precondition to the existence of a
duty because, “threats should not be regarded as a necessary or exclusive factor for precipitating an
inquiry about clinical concern”.106 They state that as a clinical and ethical matter, there may be
circumstances when a psychiatrist is legitimately concerned about potential violence in the absence of a
direct threat made by the patient.107 Further, they argue that it is crucial to distinguish between a patient
who communicates a threat and a patient who poses a threat by engaging in behaviour that indicates
planning and preparation for violence.108 It is true that some patients who verbalise threats ultimately act
on them, but many do not.109 A patient may pose a threat even though they have not communicated a
threat to anyone.110 Borum and Reddy state that it is those who appear to pose a threat that provoke the
greatest level of concern.111
By excluding those patients who pose, rather than verbalise threats, the specificity rule may conceal the very
danger that the duty was designed to protect against. It is submitted that the construction of the specificity
rule is indicative of a broader judicial struggle to confine the duty to protect within reasonable bounds. 
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CONCLUSION
Courts in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, have acknowledged that in
certain circumstances the public interest in protecting psychiatrist-patient confidentiality must yield to
the public interest in preventing innocent third parties from violence. Notwithstanding the striking
similarity in reasoning between Tarasoff and the decision of the European Court in Osman, early case law
from England favours the more conservative, discretionary model enunciated in Egdell. For the reasons
discussed above, the United Kingdom would be wise to stop short of converting the discretion to breach
confidentiality in the public interest, into a tort law duty to protect third party victims. The Supreme
Court of Texas summarised the tension inherent in the protective duty in the following extract:
If a common law duty to warn is imposed, mental health professionals face a Catch-22. They either
disclose a confidential communication that later proves to be an idle threat and incur liability to the
patient, or they fail to disclose a confidential communication that later proves to be a truthful threat
and incur liability to the victim and the victim’s family.112
Finally, it is important that we keep in mind that the public may be safeguarded in more traditional
ways.113 Prior to Tarasoff, hospitalisation was the primary means of protecting potential victims from a
patient’s violent acts in the United States.114 The author tends to agree with Felthous and Kachigian that
hospitalisation remains “the most prudent and preventative measure to handle a patient who is seriously
mentally ill, and as a result is dangerous to others”.115 Likewise, he agrees with Stone that, “emergency
civil commitment generally remains the safest and least destructive way to deal with a crisis of violence
in a mentally ill person”.116
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